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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
STEVEN TROY SPAN, Case No. 890152 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief, with the 
exception of Point I subsection 3.a., which subsection asserted 
that a prosecutor's racially motivated peremptory challenge 
violates the federal Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. This 
assertion was laid to rest in the recent Holland v. Illinois 
decision, discussed infra. Appellant refers this Court to the 
opening brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, case, 
facts, and summary of argument. Appellant answers Respondent's 
brief as follows: 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT APPELLANT, A CAUCASIAN, 
WAS NOT A MEMBER OF A COGNIZABLE RACIAL GROUP, 
AND THEREFORE COULD NOT CHALLENGE THE PROSECUTOR'S 
RACIAL MOTIVATION IN PEREMPTORILY CHALLENGING MR. PHUNG, 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A. THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THIS CASE SUPPORTS APPELLANT'S 
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL. 
The State argues that this Court's scrutiny of the 
prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung is limited to 
federal equal protection analysis, claiming that Appellant's 
1 
arguments to the trial court were based solely on Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 581 
1 
(Utah 1988). 
Please refer to the transcript, provided in Appendix 1 
of Appellant's opening brief, and note that, in argument before 
the trial court, defense counsel initially cited State v. Cantu/ 
and then argued that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge 
threatened Appellant's rights to representation of a fair cross-
section in the jury venire (T. 62-63). 
After the prosecutor explained his technique in 
exercising peremptory challenges, he noted that Appellant is not 
a minority (T. 64). Defense counsel then explained that 
Appellant's race is irrelevant to the impact Mr. Phung, as the 
only minority juror, might have on the verdict (T. 65). 
When the trial court indicated that Batson places "the 
burden on defendant to show that he's a member of a cognizable 
racial group," defense counsel argued for an interpretation of 
Batson that looks beyond the race of the defendant to "all the 
facts and circumstances" of the jury selection process (T. 65-
66). She then argued as follows: 
In fact, it is my clear recollection 
that even if this case does not specifically 
say it, that there are numerous cases which 
1 Respondent's brief at 11-13. 
2 As noted in Respondent's brief at pages 20 and 21, 
Cantu discusses not only federal equal protection, but also 
relies on cases discussing federal and state impartial jury 
provisions relating to fair cross-section representation in jury 
selection. 
2 
indicate that the defendant need not be a 
minority member himself in order to assert 
this on his behalf. 
(T. 67). 
Without addressing these other possibilities/ the trial 
court ascertained that Appellant is Caucasian/ and found that 
Appellant had not met his burden to prove that he is "a part of a 
recognizable minority group" (T. 68-69). The trial court's 
choice not to rule beyond Appellant's failure to qualify under a 
strict reading of the first requirement articulated in Batson 
might be explained by the court's primary basis for denying the 
motion to quash - timeliness of the motion^ - but is not 
explained by and should not be disposed of with Respondent's 
inaccurate waiver argument.^ 
3 Reference to the transcript bears out the trial court's 
assessment that the primary basis for its rejection of the motion 
to quash was the court's ruling that the motion was not timely. 
See T. 65-69. The State concedes that the motion to quash was 
timely raised. Respondent's brief at 7-8. 
4 Respondent intimates in footnote 4 at page 7 of 
Respondent's brief that perhaps the fact that defense counsel's 
objection was phrased as a "motion to quash the jury"# rather 
than as a motion for the prosecutor's explanation of the 
peremptory challenge, might be an independent basis for affirming 
the trial court. 
The transcript of the proceedings in the trial court 
demonstrates that defense counsel informed the trial court about 
the procedure to be followed under Cantu; "In that case the 
Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the trial court for a 
hearing as to what explanation the prosecutor would be prepared 
to give and to determine whether it was sufficient to find that 
the exercise of the challenge of a minority member was based upon 
any type of rational or objective criteria." (T .62-63). When 
the trial court turned to the prosecutor, Mr. Bown then explained 
his procedure in jury selection, in general and in this case (T. 
63-64). 
Of course, Appellant's arguments are not limited to 
federal equal protection and the formula laid out in Batson, but 
3 
B. APPELLANT'S RACE DOES NOT PRECLUDE HIS CHALLENGE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY REMOVAL OF MR. PHUNG. 
The State argues that Appellant, because of his race, 
is not entitled to challenge the prosecutor's peremptory 
challenge of Mr. Phung. 
In Holland v. Illinois, 46 CrL 2067 (No. 88-5050, 
decided January 22, 1990), the members of the United States 
Supreme Court, albeit speaking in dicta, indicated that Appellant 
is correct in asserting that he may challenge the prosecutor's 
peremptory removal of Mr. Phung without sharing racial identity 
with Mr. Phung." 
this Court might note that in Batson, the Court recognized that 
it might be an appropriate remedy, upon a finding of racial 
discrimination, to "discharge the venire and select a new jury 
from a panel not previously associated with the case". Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n. 24. 
5 Respondent's brief at 8-11. 
6 The majority opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Kennedy initially quotes 
Batson, "the defendant 'must show that he is a member of a 
cognizable racial group . . . and that the prosecutor has 
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members 
of the defendant's race'". Id* at 2067 (emphasis by the Court). 
The majority mentions in closing that it is explicitly not 
deciding the equal protection claim of a white defendant 
challenging the removal of black jurors. JEd. at 2070. Justice 
Kennedy, concurring, argues forcefully why "if the claim here [of 
a white defendant challenging the peremptory removal of black 
jurors] were based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause, it would have merit." Id. at 2071. Dissenting, Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, notes that a, 
majority of the Court "has now concluded, a close reading of 
Batson shows that a defendant's race is irrelevant to his 
standing to raise the equal protection claim recognized in that 
case." jEd.. at 2071. Justice Stevens, dissenting, argues that 
the white petitioner challenging the peremptory removal of black 
jurors "should have been permitted to prove that the exclusion of 
black jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause." IxU at 2076. 
4 
Various members of the Court provide persuasive reasons 
why Appellant's claim of prosecutorial racial discrimination in 
jury selection is not contingent on Appellant's race: 
We do not hold that systematic exclusion of 
blacks from the jury system is lawful; it 
obviously is not# see Batson, supra. 
Majority opinion at 2068. 
To bar the claim whenever the defendant's 
race is not the same as the juror's would be 
to concede that racial exclusion of citizens 
from the duty, and honor, of jury service 
will be tolerated, or even condoned. We 
cannot permit even the inference that this 
principle will be accepted, for it is 
inconsistent with the equal participation in 
civic life that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees....Batson is based in large part 
on the right to be tried by a jury whose 
members are selected by nondiscriminatory 
criteria and on the need to preserve public 
confidence in the jury system. These are not 
values shared only by those of a particular 
color; they are important to all criminal 
defendants. 
Concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, at 2071. 
The fundamental principle undergirding 
the decision in Batson was that "a 'State's 
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on 
account of race of participation as jurors in 
the administration of justice violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.'fl This principle, 
Justice Powell explained for the Court, has 
three bases: the right of the defendant "to 
be tried by a jury whose members are selected 
pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria,"; the 
right of a member of the community not to be 
assumed incompetent for and be excluded from 
jury service on account of his race' and the 
need to preserve "public confidence in the 
fairness of our system of justice[.]" 
5 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Blackmun (citations omitted). 
Batson was a black citizen, but he had no 
interest in serving as a juror and thus was 
not a member of the excluded class. His 
standing to vindicate the interests of the 
potential black jurors was based on his 
status as a defendant. Indeed, the 
suggestion that only defendants of the same 
race or ethnicity as the excluded jurors can 
enforce the jurors' right to equal treatment 
and equal respect recognized in Batson is 
itself inconsistent with the central message 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
...[W]hile the inference that the 
discriminatory motive is at work is stronger 
when the excluded jurors are of the same race 
or ethnicity as the defendant, the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges 
is not limited to that situation but may be 
present when, as here, the excluded jurors 
are not of the same race as the defendant. 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens at 2076 (citations 
omitted). 
Additional discussion of the impropriety of the trial 
court's ruling that Appellant was barred by his own race from 
challenging the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung is 
provided in Appellant's opening brief at pages 9-13. 
C. THE RELEVANT "COGNIZABLE RACIAL GROUP" INQUIRY IN THIS CONTEXT 
LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT MR. PHUNG WAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED TO 
BE A MEMBER OF A "COGNIZABLE RACIAL GROUP". 
1. THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THIS CASE SHOULD PRECLUDE THIS 
COURT FROM FINDING THAT MR. PHUNG IS NOT A MEMBER OF COGNIZABLE 
RACIAL GROUP. 
The State argues that the trial court was correct in 
denying Appellant's motion, because Appellant failed to 
demonstrate that Mr. Phung is a member of a "cognizable racial 
group". Inasmuch as the trial court's bases for denying the 
7 Respondent's brief at 65-27. 
motion were procedural (timeliness of the motion and Appellant's 
lack of racial qualification to raise the motion (T. 65, 69)), it 
is not clear whether the trial court declined to engage in Batson 
analysis after considering the first factor (Appellant's race), 
or if the trial court considered Mr. Phung a member of a 
cognizable racial group. 
This Court should be well aware that the cognizable 
8 
racial group question is one of fact. If the trial court 
recognized Mr. Phung's membership in a cognizable racial group, 
the trial court's ruling is entitled to deference on review2 
If the trial court did not reach the question of Mr. Phung's 
membership in a cognizable racial group, and if this Court is not 
satisfied that Appellant has already proved Mr. Phung's 
membership in a cognizable racial group, it would be appropriate 
for this Court to correct the trial court's procedural rulings 
(that the motion was not timely raised; that Appellant did not 
have standing to make the objection), and direct the trial court 
to reach the substantive Batson questions (i.e. Is Mr. Phung a 
member of a cognizable racial group?). 
8 Cf. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988)(in 
determining whether a prima facia case of racial discrimination 
in peremptory challenges had been made, this Court evaluated the 
facts and circumstances). 
9 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) provides that 
findings of fact are protected by the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of appellate review. 
10 The State argues in footnote 3 at pages 6 and 7 of 
Respondent's brief that because the prosecutor, in explaining his 
peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung, was not responding to "an 
order of the trial court to provide a racially neutral 
7 
2. THE CONTEXT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE "COGNIZABLE GROUP" 
CONCEPT DETERMINES THE MEANING OF THAT CONCEPT. 
There are many different federal and state 
constitutional and statutory methods of eradicating racial 
discrimination in jury selection. When faced with racial 
discrimination in jury selection, courts frequently conglomerate 
constitutional and statutory provisions and precedents. 
The State disapproves of this practice, and calls on 
explanation for the peremptory challenge to Mr. Phung", this 
Court should remand this case to the trial court for a 
procedurally correct Batson response from the prosecutor. 
If this Court is willing to remand this case and give 
the prosecutor a second opportunity to explain his peremptory 
challenge, Appellant is entitled to be treated with the same 
procedural fastidiousness. If this Court is not satisfied that 
Mr. Phung is a member of a cognizable racial group, and is not 
satisfied that the trial court so found, Appellant should be 
allowed to address the question before the trial court. 
11 See Appellant's opening brief at 10-22. 
On page 13 in footnote 7 of Respondent's brief, the 
State appears to contend that the federal and state jury 
selection laws provide no independent guidance from 
constitutional provisions, "Defendant's statutory arguments are 
effectively subsumed within his constitutional arguments, in that 
the statutes he cites merely reflect constitutional guarantees 
under the federal and state constitutions." 
While defense counsel did not mention the Utah Jury 
Selection Act in her arguments to the trial court, both the 
language of the act and this Court's decisions indicate that 
there are separate statutory and constitutional challenges to 
racial discrimination in jury selection. See State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 574 n.115, indicating that Utah Code Ann. section 
78-46-16, and the federal counterpart, provide the exclusive 
remedies for violations of the jury selection acts, and that 
constitutional challenges should be brought outside the framework 
of the Utah act. 
12 E.g. State v. Cantu, 758 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989)(in 
reviewing a prima facia case of racial discrimination under 
Batson and the prosecutor's attempted rebuttal thereto, this 
Court referred to cases decided under federal and state 
constitutional fair cross section and impartial jury provisions). 
8 
this Court to clarify the hotly contested meaning of the phrase 
"cognizable group" under a challenge to purposeful racial 
discrimination in the peremptory challenge stage of jury 
selection.13 The State notes semantic differences in the 
cognizability standards applied in equal protection, fair cross-
section and due process contexts r^ Because the cognizability 
standards are not best understood by semantic distinctions, but 
rather by the context in which they are applied, Appellant will 
use the phrase "cognizable group" throughout this discussion. 
Perhaps the most significant contextual factor in 
determining a definition of the phrase "cognizable group" is the 
mode of proof appropriate to the discrimination claim: is 
"cognizable group" used to prove purposeful discrimination by 
state actors, or is "cognizable group" used to prove 
15 
discriminatory effect of the jury selection system? 
The phrase "cognizable group" was traditionally 
applied in the context of federal Sixth Amendment claims of 
system-wide discriminatory effect in jury pools.16 in this 
traditional setting, the proof focused on statistics rather than 
13 Respondent's brief at 16-25. 
14 Respondent's brief at 15. 
15 See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 574-575 (Utah 
1987)(recognizing that discrimination is proved either by 
focusing on the discriminatory purpose of a state actor or by the 
discriminatory effect of the jury selection system. 
16 Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges 
in Criminal Trials"^ 21 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law 
Review 227, 276 n. 230 (1986). 
E.g. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
9 
purpose or intent - a claimant had to prove that the jury 
selection system failed to provide an adequate cross-section of 
the community# first by defining the statistical composition of 
the community and then by comparing it to the statistical 
composition of the jury pools for proof of disproportional 
representation. Because communities frequently contain a 
higher number of groups than can be represented on a jury, a 
claimant had to show that the underrepresented group was 
statistically significant and statistically deserving of 
proportional representation in the jury pool - a "cognizable 
18 
group". 
The "cognizable group" concept was also used as a mode 
of proof of system-wide discriminatory effect under the federal 
. 19 
Fourteenth Amendment in the selection of grand juries. In this 
context, the claimant was again required to present statistical 
proof of disproportionate representation of a statistically 
20 
significant group - a "cognizable group". 
The "cognizable group" concept was transplanted into 
claims of purposeful discrimination in People v. Wheeler, 583 
P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) .21 Wheeler, unlike the traditional cases 
17 Duren at 365-366. 
18 Duren at 364. 
19 Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
20 Id. at 494. 
21 Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges 
in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law 
Review 227, 276 n. 230 (1986). 
10 
using "cognizable group" to demonstrate statistically a system-
wide discriminatory effect, involved purposeful intent of a 
state actor, a prosecutor using peremptory challenges to remove 
black jurors from the venire. Ic3. at 752. The court explicitly 
rejected the statistical mode of proof of discrimination in this 
context, explaining the complexities of that mode of proof, and 
then focusing on the nature of voir dire: 
We need not undertake in this proceeding 
to mediate any such dispute among experts 
[concerning the accuracy of the statistical 
mode of proof], nor to decide which 
computational method is preferable for 
resolving attacks on the master list or the 
venire. Such cases are clearly 
distinguishable, as the final demographic 
composition of those lists is known when the 
issue arises: at that time, when all the 
figures are in, mathematical techniques may 
well be of assistance to the courts.... But 
they are of little help during voir dire, 
when the composition of the jury is 
constantly changing under the influence of 
challenges - and when counsel may be trying 
to expose an emerging pattern of 
discrimination in time to forestall an unfair 
trial. 
Id. at 763-764. 
The Wheeler court then indicated that the relevant 
inquiry should focus on the intent of the prosecutor, as 
reflected by his performance during the voir dire, and by his 
own explanation. Id_. at 764. 
At the time Wheeler was written (1978), Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), insulated from federal Equal 
Protection inquiry prosecutorial intent in exercising peremptory 
challenges. This perhaps explains why the Wheeler court based 
11 
its decision on federal and state constitutional fair cross-
section theory. 583 P.2d 748, at 757. Unfortunately, there is 
no explanation in Wheeler as to why the court chose to impose the 
"cognizable group" concept in this context of purposeful 
discrimination, and there is no explicit explanation of how the 
"cognizable group" concept should apply in a case focusing on 
22 
purpose of a state actor, rather than on statistics. 
Similarly, there is no explanation concerning the 
application of the "cognizable group" concept in the context of 
federal Equal Protection and purposeful discrimination of a state 
actor. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court 
imposed as an element of a prima facie case of purposeful racial 
discrimination a showing that the defendant is "a member of a 
cognizable racial group", citing Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482 (1977), a case involving statistical proof of system-wide 
discriminatory effect. 476 U.S. at 96. The Batson Court did not 
apply the "cognizable group" concept in the case before it, but 
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of 
whether Mr. Batson had presented a prima facie case, and whether 
the prosecution could rebut it. 3x3. at 100. 
In Batson, the impropriety the Court was focusing on 
was the exercise of a peremptory challenge on the basis of group 
22 Without explanation, the Wheeler court required a 
showing that the jurors stricken were members of "a cognizable 
group within the meaning of the representative cross-section 
rule", and found again without explanation that the black jurors 
stricken by prosecutor were members of such a group. 583 P.2d at 
764 and n. 26. 
12 
bias (e.g. the prosecutor struck the black jurors because he 
assumed the jurors1 conduct in the case would be determined by 
23 
their racial group). 476 U.S. at 97-98. With this in mind, 
perhaps it is best to define "cognizable group" in this context 
by looking at the behavior of the prosecutor. If the prosecutor 
is exercising the peremptory challenges in a manner indicating 
that he is acting on the basis of group bias, the jurors stricken 
24 
by the prosecutor constitute a "cognizable group". 
While many courts disagree over the application of the 
"cognizable group" concept in a case involving discriminatory 
25 . 
purpose of a state actor, in our jurisdiction, it appears that 
when a prosecutor appears to be exercising his challenges on the 
basis of race, the jurors who are challenged because of their 
race constitute cognizable group members. See State v. Cantu, 
750 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1988)(recognizing that "Hispanics or 
23 For further discussion of "group bias", see People v. 
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 759-762 (Cal. 1978); Gurney, The Case for 
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 227, 279-280 (1986); Due 
Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 
Harvard Law Review 1013, 1022-1024 (1989). 
24 See Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory 
Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 227, 276 (1986)(noting the wonderfully 
circular nature of this argument and other attempts at applying 
the "cognizable group" concept in cases of intentional 
discrimination in peremptory challenges). 
25 See Respondent's brief at 16-25; Gurney, The Case for 
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 227, 275-279 (1986); 
Note, Due Process limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 
102 Harvard Law Review 1013, 1019-1022 (1989); Altman, 
Affirmative Selection; A New Response to Peremptory Challenge 
Abuse, 38 Stanford Law Review 781, 803 n 110 (1986). 
13 
Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable racial group1 for 
purposes of equal protection analysis under Batson,")7 United 
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 
1987)(recognizing American Indians as a cognizable group under 
Batson). 
Finally, it appears that the "prima facie case" 
outlined in Batson is not set in stone. See discussion of 
Holland v. Illinois, supra, indicating that perhaps the first 
prong of the Batson test is not a mandatory showing. The 
"cognizable group" language in the Batson "prima facie case" 
should also be interpreted in light of the enduring rule of 
Batson, "In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite 
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant 
circumstances." 476 U.S. at 96. See also State v. Cantu, 750 
P.2d 591, 596 ("In applying Batson retroactively, we will examine 
the record to determine if all the 'facts and circumstances' 
raise the inference that the prosecution used its peremptory 
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner."). 
3. THE PROSECUTOR ESTABLISHED MR. PHUNG'S MEMBERSHIP IN A 
"COGNIZABLE GROUP". 
While the prosecutor's participation in the voir dire 
was minimal, his actions and words raise the inference that he 
struck Mr. Phung from the jury panel on the bases of race and 
group bias. Defense counsel initially argued that the prosecutor 
had struck the only minority venire member, arguing that 
"minority members are more likely than other members of the 
citizenry to vote for acquittal." (T. 62). In explaining his 
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peremptory challenge techniques, the prosecutor demonstrated that 
in evaluating Mr* Phung, the prosecutor was operating with 
notions of group bias: 
It's my practice, simply, if I have any 
question — it's more of a gut reaction than 
anything. It has nothing to do with his — 
in fact, I didn't even know about a study 
that says they are more likely to be — I 
think perhaps he has been around long enough, 
and perhaps I can speculate. He's been 
through enough, having come from Vietnam, 
that I think that the study would be 
different with Mr. Phung. 
(T. 64). Compare Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("Just as the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons 
from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are 
unqualified to serve as jurors, so it forbids the States to 
strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased 
in a particular case simply because the defendant is black."). 
In striking the only venire member of a minority race 
who was also the only venire member asked how long he had been a 
citizen (T. 19), and then in trying to rehabilitate his 
assessment of that prospective juror with racial generalizations, 
the prosecutor provided ample proof that Mr. Phung is a member of 
a cognizable racial group. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT 
THE UBALDI STANDARD 
IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant proffers for this Court's adoption an 
automatic reversal standard designed to stop intentional 
prosecutorial misconduct in Utah. See Appellant's opening brief 
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at pages 30-34, discussing State v. Ubaldif 462 A*2d 1001 
(Conn.)# cert, denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983). The State does not 
contest the virtue of the Ubaldi standard, but seeks to 
distinguish Ubaldi on the facts.0 Specifically, the State 
argues that contrary to the facts of the Ubaldi case, in this 
case (1) it is unclear that the prosecutor intentionally violated 
27 
the trial court's order; (2) the trial court responded 
correctly, mitigating the harm caused by the prosecutor's 
28 
"mistake/misconduct1'; and (3) defense counsel waived this 
issue by addressing the verboten evidence after the prosecutor 
29 
did. 
A. THE TRANSCRIPT SHOWS THE PROSECUTOR'S INTENTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER. 
Appellant refers this Court to Appendix 2 of his 
opening brief, the transcript which demonstrates the prosecutor's 
intent in disobeying the trial court. The prosecutor was 
examining his own witness, Grant Hodson, the owner of the burned 
apartment (T. 411). When the prosecutor asked Mr. Hodson about 
the repairs that had been done on the building since the fire, 
defense counsel objected, and the trial court asked the 
prosecutor to explain the relevance of the question (T. 412). 
The prosecutor responded, 
26 Respondent's brief at 27-31. 
27 Respondent's brief at 30-31. 
28 Respondent's brief at 31. 
29 Respondent's brief at 31. 
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Your Honor, I'm — what I'm attempting 
to do is show that one person who might be a 
suspect in the fire# this gentleman, had no 
reason to do that. 
• • • • 
Had no reason to fire — to start a fire 
in his own apartment; although he could be a 
suspect. 
(T. 413). Defense counsel indicated that she did not intend to 
address that possibility, and objected to the lack of relevance 
of questions concerning the condition of the building (T. 413). 
The trial court sustained the objection (T. 413). 
The prosecutor then asked Mr. Hodson "Did you sustain 
any losses as a result of the fire?" and defense counsel's 
objection was again sustained (T. 413). At that point a bench 
conference was held, the content of which was recorded later -
the trial court ruled inadmissible evidence concerning Mr. 
Hodson's responsibility or lack of responsibility for the fire 
(T. 418). Two questions after the bench conference, the 
prosecutor asked Mr. Hodson "Did you start that fire?" (T. 414). 
Mr. Hodson replied, "No." (T. 414). Defense counsel objected, 
the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury 
to disregard the question and answer (T. 414). 
Defense counsel's immediate motion for a mistrial 
focused directly on the prosecutor's improper conduct in 
violating the court's ruling from the bench (T. 414-416). The 
prosecutor's response to this accusation was not to deny 
intentional disobedience, but was to contest the trial court's 
understood ruling, and to argue harmless error to the trial 
court: 
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Each and every time there's a theft or a 
crime where more than one person could have 
committed it, I submit it is relevant. And 
it's asked routinely about — with people, 
"Did you commit it?" And I think that's — 
that is relevant. I can't see any — the 
Court sustaining the objection. I can't see 
that there's any prejudice to the defendant. 
(T. 416). 
The court denied the motion for a mistrial (apparently 
on the grounds that the court's instruction mitigated the harm 
caused by the prosecutor), and defense counsel ascertained that 
the prosecutor would not address the excluded evidence again (T. 
418)• Defense counsel requested the trial court to make a record 
of the bench conference, and the court did so (T. 418): 
Under the circumstances, it was 
appropriate since the landlord hadn't been 
charged, and there may be any number of 
people that might be suspects. And under the 
circumstances, I didn't think it was material 
to the case, and so indicated that would be 
my ruling. 
(T. 418). It was only then, on page 419 of the transcript, that 
the prosecutor claimed to have misunderstood that ruling, which 
ruling the prosecutor had already attacked on pages 416 and 417 
of the transcript. 
The trial court's failure to dignify the prosecutor's 
apology with an acceptance or a rejection can hardly stand as 
proof that the trial court was "satisfied" with the prosecutor's 
conduct. £f. Respondent's brief at 30-31. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S CURATIVE INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DOES NOT 
CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT. 
Considering the sequence of events reflected in the 
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transcript (after two sustained objections to the prosecutor's 
questions of Mr. Hodson, followed by a bench conference between 
the court and counsel, followed by the improper question of the 
prosecutor and the answer of Mr. Hodson, followed by an objection 
and the court's striking of testimony and instruction to the 
jurors, followed by a request by the defense for a motion 
outside of the jury's presence, the jurors were excused for a 
five-minute recess), it would indeed be fanciful to assume that 
the jurors' minds were wiped clean of the improper question and 
testimony by the court's curative instruction. 
Of course, the effectiveness of the curative 
instruction has no relevance to the characterization of the 
prosecutor's conduct. While the Ubaldi court did note the lack 
of a curative instruction in that case, the Ubaldi court seemed 
concerned not with the curative impact the instruction might have 
had on the jury, but on the corrective impact the trial court 
failed to make on the contumacious prosecutor: 
The prejudice to the judicial system as 
well as to the defendant which flows from 
circumventing the trial court's authority, 
unlike the prejudice which can be calculated 
by weighing the evidence presented, is not 
easily assessed. "If the accused be guilty, 
he should none the less be convicted only 
after a fair trial, conducted strictly 
according to the sound and well-established 
rules which the laws prescribe." We note 
that the trial court did not rebuke or 
admonish the prosecutor upon the defendant's 
objection to the improper argument. The 
trial court's general charge to the jury 
which included the standard instruction 
relating to the state's burden of proof and 
the defendant's right to remain silent, 
cannot reasonably be viewed as obviating the 
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harmfulness of the prosecutor's remarks. Nor 
do we view the failure of the defendant to 
request a curative instruction in addition to 
a mistrial as fatal to his claim where 
deliberate prosecutorial misconduct was met 
by the trial court's silence in response to a 
proper objection during summation. 
Id* at 1010 (citations omitted). 
Both the trial court and the prosecutor in this case 
need to be informed that prosecutors must treat trial courts with 
candor and respect. 
C. DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT WAIVE THIS ISSUE. 
The State claim that defense counsel waived this 
objection and issue by asking Mr. Hodson on cross-examination, 
Mr. Hodson, you've never been questioned 
as a suspect in this fire, have you? 
No. 
(T. 422-423). Noting that defense counsel addressed the same 
evidence the prosecutor elicited from Mr. Hodson, and citing 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-561 (Utah 1987), the State 
characterizes this entire issue on appeal as invited errorr^ 
Had defense counsel been the first to address this 
evidence (she was not), perhaps the State would be correct. See 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561 ("Inasmuch as defense counsel himself 
chose to initiate and argue these comments and failed to object 
to the prosecutor's response to the same, he should be deemed to 
have invited the error (if there was any) and waived the 
objection."). 
In asking Mr. Hodson if he had ever been investigated 
as a suspect in this case, defense counsel was merely trying to 
30 Respondent's brief at 31. 
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dissipate the prejudice caused by the prosecutor's improper 
questioning. Appellant has a right to a fair trial and to an 
appeal, and should not be forced to choose between the two. 
Defense counsel1s performance in seeking to salvage the trial was 
correct and should not be read as a waiver of the issue of the 
prosecutor's improper conduct. £f. State v. Guinn, 752 P.2d 632, 
636 (Idaho App. 1988)(after motion to suppress is denied and 
evidence is admitted, defendant's introduction of testimony of 
that evidence does not waive objection to is admissibility.). 
III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE. 
While Appellant is certainly aware of the standard of 
review of a sufficiency of the evidence argument, see Appellant's 
opening brief at 40-41, that standard of review is not an 
impossible one to meet. See State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
During the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor went 
through six witnesses and two hundred and ten pages of transcript 
in order to establish from the conflicting evidence that the fire 
in this case was an arson fire (T. 89-299). 
In trying to demonstrate that the fire was lit by 
Appellant, the State used about 100 pages of transcript in 
presenting the testimony of Ms. Lee (the victim of the fire, 
antagonistic to Appellant due to domestic history) (T. 308-374), 
Mr. Brown (friend of Ms. Lee's, who had altercation with 
Appellant prior to the fire and investigation)(374-387), and Ms. 
Bateman (friend of Ms. Lee's, who was drunk on the night of the 
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fire when she spoke with Appellant, and who was assisted by Ms. 
Lee when questioned by the investigating officer)(389-410). 
Undoubtedly the testimony of Mr. Hodson (eliminating 
Mr. Hodson as a suspect) added to the State's case that Appellant 
set the fire (T. 411-414). But his testimony was admitted in 
direct violation of the trial court's evidentiary ruling. 
In these circumstances, this Court should seriously 
consider Appellant's insufficiency of the evidence argument, if 
not on the argument's own merits, then for an appreciation of the 
prejudice caused by the prosecutor's misconduct. See State v. 
Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)(under traditional standards, 
prosecutorial misconduct must be prejudicial to be reversible). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this I [x day of y\\Y' # 
1990. 
^M-tcOca/ 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for* Appellant 
'1 ? I ' 
OLBROOK 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that JQ copies 
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court and 
that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the 
22 
Attorney General's Office, 236 Sfcate Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84114, this 
a^t< 
1WQ0& sS 
DELIVERED by this 
day of 1990. 
23 
